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Abstract:  
 
As network neutrality has been one of the most contentious Internet public policy 
issues of the past decade, this article provides a comparative overview of events, 
policies, and legislation surrounding Internet traffic management practises 
(ITMPs) (e.g., network neutrality) in Japan, the European Union, the United 
States, and Canada. Using the frame provided by Richard Rose of “hybrid 
lessons”  to create a policy synthesis, the paper details the telecom policy 
environment, Internet Service provider competition, legislative jurisdiction, 
remedies for ITMPs, consumer transparency, and adherence to privacy protection 
in each country. The analysis focuses on Canada’s first significant regulatory 
effort to address network neutrality, which came during the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission 2009 process on Internet traffic 
management. This paper presents a brief overview of the Canadian regulatory 
environment and the specific questions which were the subject of the CRTC 
review. Employing Richard Rose’s methods for comparative public policy 
analysis, we offer a number of regulatory “lessons” from Japan, the European 
Union, and the United States based on their experiences with traffic management 
issues. Applying these lessons to the Canadian context, we make several specific 
policy recommendations, among them that competition be encouraged within the 
Internet service provider space, that network management practises be reasonable 
and limited, and that ISPs provide full disclosure of network management policies 
and practises. 
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Résumé: 
 
Comme la question de la neutralité du réseau est devenue un des sujets les plus 
contentieux des politiques publiques entourant Internet de la dernière décennie, 
cet article offre un survol comparatif des événements, des politiques et de la 
législation entourant les pratiques de gestion du trafic Internet (PGTI) (c’est-à-
dire, de la neutralité du réseau) au Japon, dans l’Union européenne, aux États-
Unis et au Canada. En se basant sur les “hybrid lessons” (ou “leçons hybrides”) 
de Richard Rose pour créer une synthèse de politiques, ce texte fait le dessin de 
l’environnement des politiques de télécommunication, la compétition entre les 
fournisseurs de services Internet, de la compétence législative, des solutions pour 
les PGTI, de la transparence du consommateur et de l’adhésion à la protection de 
la confidentialité dans chaque pays. Cette analyse se concentre sur le premier 
effort de régulation significatif au Canada pour adresser la neutralité du réseau, 
qui a eu lieu lors du procédé du Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des 
télécommunications canadiennes en 2009 à propos de la gestion de la circulation 
sur Internet. Cet article fait le survol de l’environnement canadien de la 
réglementation et des questions spécifiques qui ont été abordées par le CRTC. En 
utilisant la méthode d’analyse comparative de politiques publiques de Richard 
Rose, nous offrons un nombre de “leçons” sur la réglementation offertes par le 
Japon, l’Union européenne et les États-Unis et qui sont basées sur leurs 
expériences avec des enjeux liés à la gestion du trafic. En appliquant ces leçons au 
contexte canadien, nous offrons plusieurs recommandations spécifiques, 
notamment que la compétition devrait être encouragée dans le milieu des 
fournisseurs de services Internet, que les pratiques de gestion de réseaux soient 
raisonnables et limitées, et que les fournisseurs d’accès Internet offrent une 
divulgation complète des politiques et pratiques de gestion de réseaux.  
 
Mots-clés: Gestion de trafic Internet; Législation de neutralité du réseau; FCC; 
Ofcom; Union européenne; CRTC 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Internet traffic management practises (ITMPs) have emerged as, perhaps, the most prominent 
technology regulatory issue in telecommunications of the past decade, and are inextricably 
linked to the problematic concept of network neutrality. Columbia Law School professor Tim 
Wu, who originated the term, described network neutrality as follows: Regulatory Lessons for Internet Traffic Management from Japan, the European Union,  
and the United States: Toward Equity, Neutrality, and Transparency 
11
 
Network neutrality is best defined as a network design principle. The idea is that a 
maximally useful public information network aspires to treat all content, sites, and 
platforms equally. This allows the network to carry every form of information and 
support every kind of application. 
 (Wu, 2007)  
 
ITMPs came to public prominence in 2007 when the largest cable company in the United States, 
Comcast Corporation, became the subject of complaints when it was found to be limiting the 
ability of its broadband Internet customers to use the popular file-sharing application BitTorrent 
(Ernesto, 2007). As detailed below, these complaints began a long series of quasi-judicial 
processes presided over by the American telecommunication regulator, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC).  
By the time similar issues found their way before Canada’s equivalent to the FCC, the 
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), the U.S. regulator 
had already ruled that Comcast’s traffic management practises violated American law. Network 
neutrality had first surfaced as an issue in Canada in 2005, when telecommunications provider 
Telus temporarily blocked Internet users’ access to websites supporting unions during a labour 
dispute, along with hundreds of other sites hosted on the same server (OpenNet Initiative, 2005). 
However, it was not until 2008 that the issue of Internet traffic management came before the 
CRTC. The Canadian Association of Internet Providers (CAIP), an organization of service 
providers that resold wholesale bandwidth from Bell Canada to retail customers, requested that 
the Commission order Bell to cease the shaping of Internet traffic; as in the Comcast case, Bell 
was degrading BitTorrent traffic (Canadian Association of Internet Providers [CAIP], 2008, July 
23rd). 
Under section 27 of the Canadian Telecommunications Act, the CRTC has powers 
relating to unjust discrimination and undue preference. CAIP argued that Bell was violating 
several sections of the Act: section 24 and subsection 25(1) concerning setting of tariffs; 
subsection 27(2) concerning unjust discrimination; and, section 36 concerning control of content 
of messages (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission [CRTC], 2008a). 
CAIP also claimed that Bell violated CRTC privacy rules, and rules requiring advance notice of 
network changes. 
In a 2008 decision, the CRTC denied CAIPs claims. However, this decision also 
announced a wide-ranging review of the Internet traffic management practices of Canadian 
Internet service providers, to take place in 2009. The objective of the review was to examine 
Internet traffic management practices and determine if they were consistent with the 
Telecommunications Act (CRTC, 2008b). It is in the context of this review that our research was 
conducted. Campaign for Democratic Media (CDM), a non-profit public interest media advocacy 
group (now called OpenMedia.ca), retained the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest 
Clinic (CIPPIC) to conduct research and make specific recommendations on Internet traffic 
management to the Commission. We were asked by the staff at CIPPIC to summarize the policy 
and regulatory environments for Internet traffic management in other large, industrialized 
jurisdictions (Fewer, Israel & Lawson, 2009). This paper is based on that research. 
The paper begins with a summary of Internet traffic management basics and a brief 
methodological discussion. We then examine a number of regulatory approaches to Internet 
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United States. Drawing on the lessons we derive from these countries, we close by evaluating to 
what extent these practises align with the CRTC’s Regulatory Policy on Internet traffic 
management practices, released in October 2009. 
 
Methods 
 
In this research we drew primarily on Richard Rose’s method of comparative public policy 
analysis (Rose, 2005). Internet traffic management offers an example of what Rose described as 
“a parallel programme”: policy challenges that many governments must address, but often in 
separate and distinct manners. Rose argues that parallel programs need not converge; even 
similar national programs do not, together, constitute a single program (Rose, 2005: 30). Many 
national jurisdictions have some sort of regulation or law (often evolving) concerning Internet 
traffic management. The scope of this governance varies considerably; in some cases, state 
control of access to content is of primary importance. In others, the reverse is true, and 
regulations are established to protect the individual’s right of access to content, and to protect 
privacy. 
In the context of comparing policy between or among jurisdictions, Rose promotes the 
concept of the lesson: a policy or programme to address domestic problems, developed from 
both domestic experience and by distilling the relevant experience of other jurisdictions (Rose, 
2005: 33). According to Rose, a lesson should not be overly general nor too specific, but restrict 
itself to essential ingredients, including legal frameworks, and impacts on the public, industry, 
and other organizations. Rose (2005: 34) described the power of international lessons and their 
ability to add stimuli to the domestic policy discourse. Because they are grounded in the practical 
experiences of other jurisdictions, they help avoid utopianism or, in many cases, partisan 
disagreements. 
Rose (2005: 100) warns us of the danger of selective imitation, when policy makers focus 
only on those aspects of policy in other jurisdictions with which they agree, essentially “cherry-
picking” features that come with little or no political cost. We therefore consider this work the 
first step in a process of creating what Rose described as a hybrid lesson on network 
management to create a policy synthesis (Ibid: 99). Rose compares this policy design process to 
reverse engineering (Ibid: 80): the mechanisms by which the studied policy was created must be 
examined, with a particular concern for the supporting policy environment and its influence. 
This study is limited to the examination of three jurisdictions (in addition to Canada): 
Japan, the European Union, and the United States of America. The selection of these 
jurisdictions was, to some extent, a response to the specific requirements of the CRTC 
telecommunications regulatory process. Given the sheer amount of information presented to the 
CRTC during this process, it was imperative that we provide clear information from which a 
limited set of high level policy lessons could easily be drawn. We therefore selected 
industrialized jurisdictions with quite different regulatory traditions. 
We recognize that examining individual European jurisdictions in greater detail (such as 
the United Kingdom or Austria), as well as other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) states (particularly Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) may 
well provide other useful policy lessons, but such work was beyond the scope of this research. 
This paper provides an overview of the policy environment in each of the selected jurisdictions, 
and can only provide an initial component that might contribute to the design of network policy 
in Canada. Regulatory Lessons for Internet Traffic Management from Japan, the European Union,  
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Network Management Basics 
 
Internet traffic management (or traffic engineering) has been a technical challenge for more than 
20 years. Initially, the Internet’s design was relatively simple, with similar hardware deployed 
across the network and substantial excess bandwidth available (Nagle, 1984). In the mid-1980s, 
however, rapid usage growth and interconnection revealed limitations in the Internet’s 
foundational protocols, resulting in concerns that the Internet could face “congestion collapse” 
and cease to function. Network protocols were therefore modified to enhance the abilities of 
Internet nodes and links to control traffic flows; in periods of congestion, a principle of fairness 
was generally applied that “backed off” all network traffic regardless of source, providing an 
environment of “equitable sharing of bandwidth” (Floyd, 2000). 
At that time, the vast majority of Internet traffic was of one type: text. The contemporary 
Internet, however, is the medium for numerous classes of content, some of which can only be 
functional if traffic is prioritized, or shaped. For example, the packets of data making up a voice-
over-IP (VoIP) call are most useful if they flow between participants in as timely a manner as 
possible. Network service providers may therefore establish technical control mechanisms which 
will reserve and prioritize network resources depending on network use (Evans & Filsfils, 2007: 
114-115). For example, VoIP might typically be prioritized over electronic mail, which is less 
time-sensitive data. These control mechanisms are called quality of service (QoS). 
Internet traffic beyond the network components ability to manage can lead to network 
congestion, with resulting increases in latency (the measure of time delay experienced when 
using the network) and packet delay variation (which users may experience as “jitter” when 
streaming media is being received). 
The question of when it is appropriate to implement QoS, and in what way, is a key 
network policy question. Using QoS, service providers have the ability to severely limit, and 
even block, certain classes of Internet traffic, as well as specific applications; this practise is 
typically called bandwidth throttling (Reisman, 2007). In some instances, applications will 
endeavour to obscure their use of the network in order to avoid throttling, attempting to make 
their traffic indistinguishable from that of other applications. Service providers have therefore 
turned to the use of specialized network surveillance technologies that allow them to analyse the 
contents of the data flowing through their network (Abelson, Ledeen & Lewis, 2009). This 
practise is called deep packet inspection (DPI). 
 
Japan 
 
Japan, along with South Korea, has the fastest commercially available Internet speeds in the 
world, as well as among the lowest prices for bandwidth (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD], 2007). Japan has seen a significant increase in Internet use 
over the past decade, accompanied in large part by very high bandwidth fibre-to-the-home 
(FTTH) deployments (Shinohar, 2007: 2). The Japanese government in 2007 set a target of 100-
percent penetration of broadband services within three years (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, 2007). 
According to Yasu Taniwaki of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, Japan maintains an Internet service provider environment that is relatively 
more competitive than that of North America, due primarily to the opening of Nippon Telegraph 
and Telephone (NTT) infrastructure to third party DSL resellers in the early-2000s (Taniwaki, John Harris Stevenson and Andrew Clement  14
2007: 8). The bulk (26.7 million) of Japan’s Internet households utilize DSL or fibre; only 4.2 
million access the Internet through cable (Paul Budde, 2010). 
As part of its “New Competition Policy Program 2010”, the Japanese government has 
indicated that the Internet in Japan should provide “equal access to networks” with “equitable 
cost distribution [between] networks” (Taniwaki: 18). Therefore, traffic management practises 
should allow the network to be generally accessible to a variety of applications, protocols, and 
users. 
In response to public concerns about ISP traffic management practises, in 2007 the 
government mandated Japan’s telecommunication industry and Internet service providers to 
create a set of operational guidelines for traffic management, which would be compatible with 
Japanese law and government policies. Four telecommunications carrier organizations—the 
Japan Internet Providers Association (JAIPA), the Telecommunications Carriers Association 
(TCA), the Telecom Services Association (TELESA), and the Japan Cable and 
Telecommunications Association (JCTA)—established the Study Group on the Guideline for 
Packet Shaping in September 2007, and published a national ISP “Guideline for Packet Shaping” 
in May 2008 (Peake, 2008). 
In the Guideline, Peake (2008) provides a clear set of prioritized responses to traffic 
management issues on Japanese networks. It states that its “basic concept” is that the first 
response to network congestion should be increasing network capacity (Ibid). Only in 
“exceptional circumstances” should traffic shaping be used “where the traffic of a specific heavy 
user excessively occupies the network bandwidth and consequently degrades the service of 
general users” (Ibid: 4). The Guideline describes two types of acceptable traffic shaping: 
restricting the bandwidth, or cancelling the access, of heavy users, and restricting the bandwidth 
use of specific network applications. 
The exact meanings of “heavy user” and “specific application” are allowed to vary on 
case-by-case basis, depending on specific ISP capacity. However, the Guideline states that 
objective data must be used to justify the traffic management; data must show that the quality of 
service for all users is being degraded by traffic from some users or applications (Peake, 2008: 4-
5). 
The Guideline further states that it is not reasonable to implement packet shaping 
measures uniformly against all users of a peer-to-peer file sharing software, as it is impossible 
for the ISP to determine the legality of the content distributed (Peake, 2008: 4). Further, it is also 
considered inappropriate to completely block the traffic from such applications, as “more 
moderate” methods of traffic management are available (Ibid: 9). 
The Guideline also indicates that it would be contrary to Japanese law to implement 
traffic shaping without obtaining clear consent from customers. As a practical matter, users must 
be informed about their ISP’s packet shaping policy in their contract terms and conditions, and 
agree to them. Service providers are also required to present relevant information to content 
providers and other ISPs about any traffic shaping that may impact them (Peake, 2008: 11). The 
Guideline states explicitly that traffic shaping must respect individual user privacy, therefore 
making such technologies as deep packet inspection unusable in Japan (Ibid: 6-7). 
The Guideline allows packet shaping without consent of the user only if such network 
management is “lawfully justifiable”, typically in cases where the integrity of the network is 
threatened from a security standpoint (Peake, 2008: 7). 
Peer-to-peer technology, while known to be the source of significant traffic management 
challenges in Japan, is also considered a possible solution for the efficient, decentralized Regulatory Lessons for Internet Traffic Management from Japan, the European Union,  
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distribution of media content (Taniwaki, 2008). Along with sponsoring the development of the 
Guideline, in 2007 the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications supported the 
creation of a “P2P Network Experiment Council”, made up of content providers, electronics 
manufacturers, and ISPs (MIC, 2008). The Council was mandated with the task of studying the 
use of P2P technologies for the distribution of audio and video content to Japanese consumers. 
In 2007, the P2P Network Experiment Council stated that it believed that Japan, despite 
having among the largest capacity consumer networks in the world, was unlikely to successfully 
distribute new media content without peer-to-peer distribution (Taniwaki, 2008). In 2007 and 
2008, the Council conducted experiments on P2P content distribution, including the sharing of 
animation titles from GONZO K.K. (GDH K.K., 2007). 
 
European Union 
 
Most European households lack a “second wire” beyond that originally installed for telephony 
which could provide domestic high speed Internet access (Carter, Marcus & Wernick, 2008: 38). 
However, competition among European ISPs is generally considered more robust than in North 
America, as more than 40 percent of DSL service (varying substantially by country) is provided 
by third party resellers. According to Carter, Marcus and Wernick (2008), real competition exists 
in this environment only if the wholesale bandwidth provider is prevented from negatively 
impacting the quality of the service its retail competitors offer to their customers. 
European telecom regulators have traditionally emphasized competition in the retail 
sector as a key mechanism to protect telecommunications and broadband consumers (Castle, 
2008). Regulators believed that if a particular service provider in some way restricted user rights 
(for example, to access VoIP or P2P networks) the user would be able to switch to another ISP 
that did not engage in the practise. Rather than taking a particular stand on what network services 
should be offered, regulators relied on the market to provide a strong incentive for ISPs to satisfy 
consumers with varying services (Carter, Marcus & Wernick, 2008). Carter et al. described the 
2002 European Union Telecommunications policy framework for ISPs as follows:  
 
The current framework explicitly allows operators to offer different services to 
different customer groups, since price discrimination is perceived as welfare 
enhancing. It does not allow those who are in a dominant position to discriminate 
against others in an anticompetitive manner; however, it does not provide 
[national regulatory agencies] with the means to intervene against operators which 
are not deemed to have [significant market power] in the event that they 
discriminate against others. 
 (2008: 43)  
 
In 2006, UK mobile provider T-Mobile launched its Web’n’Walk G3-based mobile Internet 
service, but specifically disallowed the use of voice over IP (VoIP) and instant messaging (IM) 
over its network (Williams, 2006). Peter Ingram (2006) of UK telecom regulator Ofcom has 
argued that because customers could switch to other mobile Internet offerings that did not have 
these restrictions, T-Mobile was forced by competition to modify its offering to allow such 
activities, though at an increased price, providing a “market solution” to the matter.  
In 2008, the European Commission (the executive branch of European Union) made a 
series of recommendations concerning the imposition of minimum quality of services on John Harris Stevenson and Andrew Clement  16
providers in order to discourage service or user discrimination. The majority of these 
recommendation were subsequently endorsed, in principle, by the European Parliament (Reding, 
2008, September 30). While recognizing that “legitimate network management practices . . . and 
traffic prioritization” can be important drivers of growth and innovation for ISPs, then European 
Commissioner for Information Society and Media Viviane Reding stated in September 2008 that 
anti-competitive behaviour limiting consumer choice should be considered unacceptable. As 
well, Reding indicated that the EU may, in future, impose “minimum quality levels for network 
transmission services based on technical standards” (2009, February 3). 
Concerns were also raised about the use of deep packet inspection for commercial 
advertising targeting, and by computer security firms, by the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, which advises the European Union on privacy matters (Horten, 2009, February 19). 
Proposed amendments to existing European telecom legalisation, EU Directive 
2002/22/EC concerning “universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks”, were considered by the European Parliament in 2009. These 
amendments, popularly called “the Telecom Package 2009”, contained a number of 
recommendations dealing specifically with network management. These included provisions “to 
prevent degradation of service and hindering or slowing of traffic over networks”, and 
encouraging or mandating national regulators to establish minimum quality levels and provide 
up-to-date information for consumers concerning their QoS practices (European Union, 2009, 
December 18). Some amendments, designed to ensure that users’ access to particular types of 
content or applications were not unreasonably restricted, were opposed by telecommunications 
providers (Horten, 2009, February 16). While the revised Telecom Package passed in December 
2009 lacked some of the proposed wording on quality of service or network neutrality, clause 28 
of the Act’s preamble was clear: 
 
End-users should be able to decide what content they want to send and receive, 
and which services, applications, hardware and software they want to use for such 
purposes, without prejudice to the need to preserve the integrity and security of 
networks and services. 
 
European regulation continues to evolve. In an April 13, 2010 speech to a conference organized 
by the French telecommunications regulator, the new EU Digital Agenda Commissioner Neelie 
Kroes indicated that Europe must take stronger action on network neutrality, promising support 
for principles of freedom of expression and transparency (Kroes, 2010; OUT-LAW.COM, 2010, 
April 15). As well, on June 28
th 2010, the United Kingdom telecom and media regulator began a 
process of reviewing Internet traffic management practises of British ISPs, the terms of which 
are somewhat similar to the CRTC’s review (Office of Communications, 2010, June 28).  
 
United States of America 
 
When compared to Japan and Europe, broadband competition is more limited in the United 
States; according to the Congressional Research Service, the American ISP market is largely one 
of ISP duopolies (Goldfarb, 2006). In the United States, cable television and telephone 
infrastructures are regulated differently; the Telecommunications Act of 1996 designated cable as 
an information service, while telephone-based Internet access services are telecommunications 
services (Reardon, 2005). Only telecommunications services are subject to common carrier rules; Regulatory Lessons for Internet Traffic Management from Japan, the European Union,  
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cable companies, unlike telephone providers, are not required by law to resell or share their 
infrastructure with third party retailers (Glanzer, 2005). 
In August 2005 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a Broadband 
Policy Statement which applied to cable, DSL, and other broadband providers (FCC, 2005). 
Although the statement did not have the weight of an enforceable FCC rule, the Commission 
indicated that it would incorporate it into future policymaking. Stating that the “Commission has 
a duty to preserve and promote the vibrant and open character of the Internet as the 
telecommunications marketplace enters the broadband age” (FCC, 2005: 3) the FCC adopted the 
following four principles:  
 
1.  To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to access 
the lawful Internet content of their choice. 
2.  To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to run 
applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law 
enforcement. 
3.  To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to connect 
their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network. 
4.  To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
competition among network providers, application and service providers, and 
content providers. 
 (FCC, 2005: 3)  
 
However, in a footnote, the FCC offered the qualification that “all of these principles are subject 
to reasonable network management”.  
Rather than drafting rules which reflected the Broadband Policy Statement, the FCC 
instead transformed it into an enforceable standard through an adjudicatory process involving the 
second largest Internet service provider in the United States, Comcast Corporation (Goldman, 
2008). In 2007, several media outlets reported that Comcast had been preventing subscribers 
from using peer-to-peer technology to legally share files online (Svensson, 2007). An 
investigation by the Electronic Frontier Foundation revealed that Comcast actively interfered 
with P2P traffic by masquerading as a user’s computer and resetting peer-to-peer connections 
(Schoen, 2007). Comcast subscribers had not been informed about this practise (Carter, Marcus 
& Wernick, 2008: 25). 
Comcast initially denied interfering with BitTorrent traffic, then stated that P2P traffic 
was “delayed” rather than blocked, a technical analogy that many considered inaccurate (Carter, 
Marcus & Wernick, 2008: 25-26). In November 2007, Comcast issued a statement justifying 
interference with P2P traffic as sound network management (Robuck, 2007). 
Comcast’s network infrastructure was not designed to carry the large volumes of 
upstream traffic essential to BitTorrent (Carter, Marcus & Wernick, 2008: 26). The Comcast 
network used a single router at the cable head end to control transmission in the downstream 
direction, allowing adequate traffic management for downloads, but making upstream 
management, controlled by user cable modems, much more difficult. Comcast’s approach was to John Harris Stevenson and Andrew Clement  18
reset peer-to-peer connections at regular intervals, after which the network would allow the 
transfer (Ibid: 27). 
In November 2007, media reform organization Free Press filed a complaint with the FCC 
against Comcast, asking the Commission to rule “that an Internet service provider violates the 
FCC’s Internet Policy Statement when it intentionally degrades a targeted Internet application” 
(Free Press, 2007). Separately, P2P video distributor Vuze filed a similar petition (Vuze, 2007). 
In the subsequent proceeding, the FCC focused on determining the degree to which 
Comcast’s actions were “reasonable network management practices”, asking the ISP whether 
such practises had been “carefully tailored to its interest in easing network congestion” (Carter, 
Marcus & Wernick, 2008: 47). In August 2008, the Commission ruled that the traffic 
management techniques the ISP had used were unreasonable. As for alternatives and reasonable 
remedies, the FCC recommended that Comcast use per-user bandwidth caps and fees for high 
levels of traffic. 
The Commission did not rule on Comcast’s failure to notify its customers of its traffic 
management practices. However, it ordered Comcast to disclose to the Commission its network 
management practices and inform the public of details of its future network management 
practices (Carter, Marcus & Wernick, 2008: 48). In its Comcast ruling, the FCC announced its 
intention to deal with future traffic management issues on a case-by-case basis, creating no 
detailed regulation concerning traffic management. 
Comcast subsequently implemented a set of “protocol-agnostic” traffic management 
techniques in December 2008 (Fisher, 2008). In its September 19
th 2008 compliance submission 
to the FCC, Comcast stated that new congestion management hardware and software would be 
purchased and deployed between customers’ cable modems and Comcast’s Internet backbone 
(Comcast, 2008: 2-5). Comcast established two quality of service (QoS) levels for user Internet 
access: a “priority” (PBE) level, the default for all users, and a “best effort” (BE) level, which 
would limit the modem’s bandwidth use (Ibid: 6). A user causing network congestion would 
receive BE status, limiting bandwidth while retaining network connectivity. Comcast has 
provided no specific indications as to what notifications customers receive when their traffic is 
restricted, nor if statistics detailing such management will be made publicly available (Comcast, 
2010). 
While Comcast modified its network management practises, it also appealed the FCC’s 
ruling in Federal Court on a variety of grounds. On April 6, 2010, the FCC’s 2008 cease and 
desist order against Comcast was rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals, who ruled that the FCC 
had no statutory powers to regulate any Internet provider’s network, or the management of its 
practices. On May 6
th, 2010, FCC chairman Julius Genachowski announced that the agency 
would begin the process to reclassify broadband Internet services as a telecommunications 
service, exempting them from many telecommunications rules but imposing network neutrality 
provisions (Wyatt, 2010, May 6). This action has promoted legislative responses, as some 
American lawmakers have begun a review of applicable legislation, the Communications Act 
(Wyatt, 2010, May 24), while others have introduced legislation that would require that the FCC 
demonstrate market failure before new rules could be enacted (Corbin, 2010, July 22). At the 
time of this writing, the issue remains unresolved. 
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Internet Traffic Management: High Level Lessons and Canadian Comparisons 
 
Our analysis leads us to highlight high level Rosean lessons on Internet traffic management 
practises in seven principle areas; we will briefly examine how these lessons align with the 
October 21
st 2009 CRTC decision on Internet traffic management policy, Telecom Regulatory 
Policy CRTC 2009-657. We will also suggest some areas for further development by the 
Commission and the Canadian federal government. The ITMP regulatory environment is further 
summarized in Table 1, below. 
Lack of clear jurisdiction is an ongoing issue in ITMP regulation. Network traffic 
management regulation remains contested in both the United States and Europe, resulting in 
uncertainty for both users and industry. In particular, while the FCC has made strong policy 
statements, they have seemingly overstepped their jurisdiction, resulting in speculation that a 
legislative solution will be necessary. The contrast between Japan and the United States is 
telling, as the Japanese government conceives of Internet traffic management as a component in 
a broader, long-term telecommunications strategy. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications sees broadband competition as a key element in consumer choice, and has 
worked closely with the ISP industry to create a framework for acceptable traffic management. 
As of this writing, there has been no challenge to the CRTC’s authority in the area of 
Internet traffic management regulation. While federal jurisdiction over both telecommunications 
and broadcasting policy have been subject to provincial challenge in the past, that has not been 
an issue following this process. Therefore, Canada currently has a seemingly stable environment 
for Internet regulation. 
Traffic throttling is typically not the first remedy applied to network congestion. All 
studied jurisdictions allow traffic shaping in cases of network congestion. However, in Japan and 
the US, other remedies for congestion are prescribed before traffic shaping is allowed, among 
them increasing network capacity and charging users for bandwidth. 
Similarly, the CRTC proscribed remedies for traffic congestion to place increased 
capacity and economic mechanisms ahead of technical ITMP. Paragraph 36 of the CRTC policy 
states that while ISPs are allowed to employ traffic shaping in response to network congestion, 
“investment in network capacity is a fundamental tool for dealing with network congestion and 
should continue to be the primary solution that ISPs employ”. Paragraph 40 further notes that 
ISPs may use “economic ITMPs” which link rates to consumer consumption. 
Technical ITMPs are typically limited and reasonable. In all the studied jurisdictions, 
ITMPs must be applied in a “reasonable” manner that reflect the circumstances of the 
congestion. As well, ITMP must be technically-justified and technically sound. Of note, the FCC 
has forcefully applied a reasonableness test to ISP traffic management practices, stating that 
application-based throttling is “discriminatory and arbitrary” and does not constitute “reasonable 
network management” (FCC, 2008: 1). In Japan, limiting of bandwidth must only be done in 
exceptional circumstances, after bandwidth capacity has been increased on the network. While 
network management practises vary across Europe, many ISPs, such as the United Kingdom’s 
Virgin Media, engage in application-agnostic management (Virgin Media, 2008). There is no 
indication from any of these jurisdictions that application-agnostic techniques limit an ISP’s 
ability to adequately manage their network. 
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Table 1: Summary of approaches to Internet traffic management in Japan,  
the European Union, the United States and Canada 
 
  Japan European  Union  USA  Canada 
Telecom policy 
environment 
“Equal access to 
networks” with 
“equitable cost 
distribution 
[between] networks” 
Different services to 
different customers 
Anti-competitive 
behaviour 
unacceptable 
FCC mandated rights to 
access lawful content, 
applications, connect 
devices, competitive market 
 
Regulator (CRTC) 
instructed by 
government to take 
market-based 
approach to 
implementing 
Telecom Act 
Jurisdiction  Co-regulation 
through national 
government-
mandated industry 
guidelines  
Member states have 
varying 
responsibilities to 
regulate 
Rules under review 
and in flux at both 
state and EU levels 
Legislation: EU 
Telecom Policy 
Framework 
FCC jurisdiction disputed; 
legislation may be required 
Legislation: 
Telecommunications Act of 
1996 
Regulation: FCC 
Broadband Policy 
Statement 2005 and 
Comcast ruling 2008 
Clear jurisdiction  
Legislation: 
Telecommunications 
Act (1993) 
Regulation: CRTC 
Telecom Regulatory 
Policy 2009-657 
Remedies  Increasing network 
capacity  
Traffic shaping in 
exceptional 
circumstances on 
individual basis  
Individual restricting 
of bandwidth 
Competition among 
ISPs provides 
consumer choice 
among congestion 
remedies 
Increasing network capacity  
Per-user bandwidth caps 
and fees 
Temporary traffic 
reprioritization on per user 
basis if network congested 
Increasing network 
capacity 
Economic 
mechanisms 
Traffic shaping 
Telecom policy 
environment 
Traffic shaping must 
be applied 
reasonably on a per-
user basis 
Largely up to 
member states 
Traffic shaping must be 
applied on a case-by-case 
basis; must be “carefully 
tailored” 
Traffic shaping must 
be limited and 
reasonable; 
complaints-driven 
process 
Jurisdiction  Users informed of 
traffic shaping 
policies 
Inform users of QoS; 
changes to terms of 
service common 
Inform public of future 
network management 
practices 
Inform public of 
current and future 
ITMP 
Remedies  Must be protected  Concerns raised 
about deep packet 
inspection 
Applicable federal 
legislation 
Personal 
information must 
only be used for 
ITMP and protected 
Telecom policy 
environment 
Application 
agnostic; 
experiments with 
P2P encouraged 
Up to member states  Application agnostic  Application-specific 
ITMPs may violate 
the Act 
Jurisdiction  Close state-private 
cooperation on 
industrial policy 
Competition seen as 
key mechanism to 
insure consumer 
choice and protect 
rights 
Most markets duopolies; 
competition limited but 
seen as important  
Competition limited 
but seen as adequate 
by regulator 
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We note that the CRTC found that ITMPs may, in some cases, represent a violation of the non-
discrimination provisions of the Canadian Telecommunications Act. Similar to the United States, 
the CRTC has established that disputes concerning ITMPs will be resolved using a case-by-case, 
ex post (complaints-based) regulatory approach. Users who believe that an ISP’s ITMP is in 
violation of the Telecommunications Act may complain to the Commission (Paragraph 3 & 28); 
the policy states that the complainant must prove that the ITMP “discriminates or results in a 
preference or disadvantage”, while the responding ISP must establish that “any . . . 
discrimination, preference, or disadvantage” created by the ITMP “is not unjust, undue, or 
unreasonable”. As well, ISPs must limit their use of ITMP to the specific needs of traffic 
management, and not for other things (2). 
Transparency around ITMP use is seen as central to consumer choice. In all three 
studied jurisdictions, we have seen varying commitments to clear and accessible public 
statements from ISPs detailing their Internet traffic management practices. In Japan and the 
United States, this has been required by regulators. In Europe, we found the practice to be 
common, and it is likely to be required soon by national regulators. Implicit in this transparency 
is the necessity of ISPs providing objective, verifiable data about network congestion to justify 
traffic management practises. This is required in Japan and of Comcast. 
As detailed in Paragraphs 58 through 60 of the policy, the CRTC has mandated that ISPs 
must disclose both their economic and technical Internet traffic management practises to 
consumers. The information must be available “clearly and prominently” on ISP websites, as 
well as in all marketing materials, user contracts, and terms of service. Information must include 
why ITMPs are being used, who is effected and when the ITMP will be used, what type of traffic 
is impacted, and how the users’ Internet used will be impacted (60). These directives align well 
with similar directives in other jurisdictions we studied. 
The practise of deep packet inspection raised substantial privacy concerns in all 
jurisdictions. It is clear that the use of deep packet inspection and similar technologies, which 
may violate privacy laws in many countries, is not necessary to manage Internet traffic. The 
Japanese traffic management guideline clearly forbids the use of DPI, and Comcast also appears 
to have now found its use to be unnecessary. 
Finding it “appropriate to establish privacy provisions in order to protect personal 
information”, the CRTC directed ISPs to use collected personal information from both wholesale 
and retail customers only for the purposes of traffic management (103). Information is not to be 
disclosed or used for any other purpose. In this area, the policy aligns well with similar rules in 
the United States and Japan, and with the framework of EU communications regulation in this 
area. 
Competition is considered an important component in protecting consumer rights. Both 
Japan and Europe emphasize the importance of competition to protecting consumer rights. 
Choice is severely limited when an upstream ISP throttles traffic for its wholesale customers. In 
Europe, it appears that ISPs must typically inform their wholesale customers about their traffic 
management practices, and must provide as close to a “vanilla” wholesale service as possible to 
resellers. 
As in other jurisdictions, the CRTC sees competition as a key means of insuring 
reasonable ITMPs. However, the level of consumer choice which the Canadian regulator has 
judged to be adequate for market forces to function is more akin to the United States than to 
Europe. The CRTC reiterates its conclusion in Telecom Order 99-592, which stated that the 
Canadian retail ISP market was “sufficiently competitive to protect the interests of users” John Harris Stevenson and Andrew Clement  22
(Paragraph 12), and cites the Governor in Council’s Policy Direction to rely on “market forces to 
the maximum extent feasible”. 
ITMPs may limit innovation. While network management practises vary across Europe, 
many ISPs, such as the United Kingdom’s Virgin Media, engage in application-agnostic traffic 
management (Virgin Media, 2008). There is no indication from any of these jurisdictions that 
application-agnostic techniques limit an ISP’s ability to adequately manage their network. In 
addition to mandating the creation of a Guideline for Packet Shaping in 2008, the Japanese 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication also sponsored a public-private partnership to 
study the use of peer-to-peer technology for media distribution. 
In contrast, the CRTC policy speaks of innovation in relatively broad terms, but 
concludes that it wishes to find a “balance between society’s interest in innovation in computer 
communications and its equally legitimate concern regarding the rights of carriers to manage the 
traffic thus generated” (Paragraph 9). The Commission does not elaborate on what basis ISPs 
have such a “right”, nor how it serves to further the objectives of the Telecommunications Act. 
We also note that even though it was complaints about the throttling of peer-to-peer file-
sharing traffic that initiated the CRTC process, it is not specifically mentioned in the policy. By 
the throttling of all types of P2P traffic, Canadian service providers may be missing an 
opportunity to explore new means of distributing rich media content. As we have noted, the 
Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication sponsored a public-private partnership 
to study the use of peer-to-peer technology for media distribution. Peer-to-peer technology may 
evolve into a legitimate form of media distribution, and it is detrimental to Canadian 
broadcasters and creators to allow this form of distribution to be crippled. 
 
Conclusion 
 
When the recommendations arising from our research were first submitted to the CRTC in 2009, 
it was easy to argue that Internet traffic management in Canada, as applied by ISPs and regulated 
by the Commission, was in an immature state, much to the detriment of Canadian Internet users. 
In the past several months it has become clear that, while ITM policy remains in flux in other 
jurisdictions, Canada presents (for the moment) a somewhat more stable regulatory environment, 
though one with which various stakeholders—industry and civil society both—may not be 
completely satisfied. 
We consider this research to be a preliminary contribution to the ongoing process of 
Internet policy formation in Canada. As has been noted by others, including most recently by the 
current Chair of the CRTC, Canada has been less proactive than other jurisdictions in addressing 
with policy a technological milieu in which the Internet is emerging as a common platform for 
media distribution and communications. We believe that further comparative public policy 
analysis in areas of Internet regulation will be of significant benefit to the formation of similar 
policies in Canada. 
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